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Forum and Substance:
Introduction to the Symposium
by LouIs B. SCHWARTZ*
The essays in this symposium address two seemingly narrow
issues in the long history of efforts by the United States to
bring American Telephone and Telegraph Company (AT&T or
Bell System) into compliance with the antitrust law. There is
first a technical or formal issue: whether jurisdiction to enforce
certain standards with regard to the permissible diversification
of telephone holding companies should remain where it now is,
namely, in the United States District Court, or be transferred
to the Federal Communications Commission (FCC). The sub-
stantive issue is whether the newly divested Bell Operating
Companies (BOCs) should be free to engage in unrelated non-
telephone businesses.
This substantive issue is at the core of the controversy ex-
plored in the present symposium, though much of the discus-
sion addresses the formal issue of transfer of jurisdiction from
the court to the FCC.' It seems clear that the legislation intro-
duced by Senator Robert Dole (R-Kansas),2 seeking to transfer
jurisdiction, herein much discussed, has little point other than
to substitute the more accommodating substantive standard of
the FCC for the stricter standard of the district court. In the
coming legislative struggle over the Dole Bill, controversy will
center on conditions to be attached to the transfer; for example,
whether the transfer should be conditioned on maintaining, to
some degree, the policy against phone company diversification.
A sophisticated judgment on the issues of forum and substance
requires some background on the history of relations between
the United States and the Bell System.
For three-quarters of a century the United States has con-
* Professor of Law, U.C. Hastings College of the Law, Emeritus Benjamin
Franklin and University Professor of Law, University of Pennsylvania.
1. The U.S. District Court for Washington, D.C. currently oversees the continu-
ing process of divestment which most recently began in 1982. See United States v.
American Tel. & Tel. Co., 552 F. Supp. 131, 226 (D.D.C. 1982) [hereinafter AT&T].
2. S. 2565, 99th Cong., 2d Sess., 132 CONG. REC. S7744 (1986).
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fronted AT&T in recurrent legal contests over AT&T's alleged
monopolistic power and predatory behavior. The monopoly de-
rived originally from patents for telephone inventions lawfully
granted by the government itself. As the patents on this
unique communications technology ran out, the monopoly-
now no longer authorized by law-was extended by classic in-
dustrial tactics that evoked application of the antitrust laws:
systematic preemption of the field by improvement patents;
patent pooling to dominate electrical technology and to divide
the enlarged market among powerful potential competitors;
use of patent power to control trade in unpatented supplies
and service; acquisition of competing enterprises; extension of
control to alternative technologies like the telegraph, wireless,
and satellite communications; and abuse of monopoly
franchises in telephone exchange operations to impede compet-
itors from offering various services and commodities.'
One can see a remarkable pattern in the outcome of the peri-
odic legal confrontations of AT&T and the government. The
government always appears to win, but victory is embodied in
an agreement between AT&T and its prosecutors rather than
in an independent adjudication and judgment of a court. In
other words, AT&T "cops a plea," and the plea bargain proves
advantageous to AT&T.
Such was the case in the historic Kingsbury Commitment of
1913, ending the first antitrust suit against AT&T. The basic
structure of the Bell System was not disturbed. AT&T re-
mained in control of both long distance and local service, but
was simply required to desist from further acquisitions of com-
peting independents. The independents were guaranteed inter-
connection with the Bell System, but remained heavily
dependent on AT&T for major sources of their income in the
form of a subsidy share of tolls derived from use of joint facili-
ties. The integration of the regulated telephone operations
with the manufacture and sale of telephone equipment by
Western Electric Company, another Bell System company, con-
tinued, giving the Bell System a protected market for its own
nonregulated manufactures. AT&T was required to divest it-
self of Western Electric, presumably to prevent the potential
for technological competition between "record" communication
3. This history is discussed in detail in McKenna & Slyter, The Modification of
Final Judgment: An Exercise in Judicial Overkill, 9 CoMM/ENT L.J. 9, 13 (1986).
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(telegrams) and "voice" communication (telephone). But a sys-
tem of patent cross-licensing soon developed whereby the par-
ties insulated each other from inter-technological competition.4
In 1932, another consent decree, directed mainly at the divi-
sion of fields by the patent pool, also detached RCA from Gen-
eral Electric in an effort to free the broadcasting market from
the control of a giant equipment supplier. But that decree,
although it struck down provisions of the patent pool arrange-
ment forbidding the pool participants from licensing competing
manufacturers, did not disturb the practice of restricting
licenses to designated fields of application. This validated and
facilitated non-competitive exploitation of patented technology,
since partners in the patent pool could be assured against inva-
sion of reserved market domains by other pool partners.5
In 1956, an antitrust initiative against the Bell System foun-
dered when the Department of Justice acquiesced in a notori-
ously lenient consent decree6 under circumstances summarized
and sharply criticized by Judge Harold H. Greene when he
came to review still another AT&T consent decree in 1982.7
Judge Greene's opinion, drawing on Congressional committee
hearings, disclosed that AT&T attempted to have the 1956 case
dismissed by enlisting the Department of Defense's interces-
sion with the Department of Justice. This effort failed but was
renewed when the Eisenhower administration came into office.
Eisenhower's Attorney General Herbert Brownell was re-
corded as believing that "a way ought to be found to get rid of
the case" and that AT&T "could readily find practices that
[they] might agree to have enjoined with no real injury to their
business."8 Not surprisingly, the resulting 1956 consent decree
included no divestiture of Western Electric or other structural
reorganization of the Bell System. Its injunctive provisions
4. See WOOD, PATENTS AND ANTITRUST LAW 128-45 (1942) cited in L. SCHWARTZ,
J. FLYNN & H. FIRST, FREE ENTERPRISE AND ECONOMIC ORGANIZATION: ANTITRUST
936 (6th ed. 1983); General Talking Pictures Co. v. Western Elec. Co., 305 U.S. 124, 126
(1938).
5. See criticism of this decree and its successor in Hearings on Proposed Reorgan-
ization of AT&T before the Antitrust Subcommittee of the House Judiciary Commit-
tee, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. (1958); Hearings on the Consent Decree Program of the
Department of Justice, 86th Cong. 1st Sess. (1959), as cited in AT&T, 552 F. Supp at
136.
6. See 1956 Table of Cas. (CCH) 71, 134 (Jan. 24, 1956).
7. AT&T, 552 F. Supp. 131 (D.D.C. 1982) affd sub nom., Maryland v. U.S., 460
U.S. 1001 (1983).
8. Id.
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were later characterized as "inadequate" by the Department of
Justice itself when it filed a new antitrust action against AT&T
in 1974.9
The new action, once again, sought structural relief including
divestiture of Western Electric and the Bell telephone operat-
ing subsidiaries. Once again, the controversy was resolved by a
deal (a negotiated consent decree, hereinafter referred to as the
Modified Final Judgment (MFJ)) between the Department of
Justice and AT&T.1" The Department of Justice was repre-
sented by William Baxter, head of the Antitrust Division and,
as an adherent to the Chicago School of Economics, dedicated
to the narrowest possible view of the antitrust laws and to max-
imum freedom of businessmen from governmental interfer-
ence. The AT&T deal was announced simultaneously with
Baxter's decision to drop a long-pending suit against IBM.
The MFJ gave AT&T what it wanted most: retention of
Western Electric and freedom to engage in unregulated com-
merce, a diversification prohibited (albeit ineffectually) by the
1956 injunction. However, the government was also able to
claim an impressive victory, because the price exacted for the
concessions to AT&T seemed staggering: a vast structural reor-
ganization of the Bell System. AT&T was required to divest
itself of the Bell operating subsidiaries constituting two thirds
of its assets. This divestiture was accomplished by spinning off
the stock of the subsidiaries to seven independent Regional
Bell Operating Companies (RBOCs). The operations of the
RBOCs were to be confined to regulated communications, pur-
suant to the underlying theory of the settlement, which will
now be described briefly.
In Baxter's view, the evil to be remedied by the MFJ was the
integration of unavoidably noncompetitive government-regu-
lated telephone communications with competitive, unregulated
business enterprises where fair competition among them might
be distorted." Such a distortion could result either from subsi-
dizing non-telephone operations out of high rates charged to
captive telephone customers or by giving special business con-
cessions to affiliated suppliers. Accordingly, the central theme
of the Baxter consent decree was to isolate the regulated mo-
9. AT&T, 552 F. Supp. at n.18.
10. The MFJ is appended to AT&T, 552 F. Supp. at 226.
11. Competitive Impact Statement in Connection with Proposed Modification of
Final Judgment, 47 Fed. Reg. 7170 (1982).
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nopoly components of the Bell System from components of the
system that were or should have been competitive.
Fundamental to this approach was the view that AT&T,
shorn of its control of local monopoly telephone service, would
be effectively competitive with other suppliers of long distance
service to the RBOCs. This view seemed plausible in view of
the appearance of MCI, Sprint, and other competitors even
prior to the MFJ. However, subsequent experience has some-
what undermined belief in the possibility of effective competi-
tion in long distance service. AT&T persistently retains
upwards of eighty percent of the market. It can be plausibly
maintained that new rivals survive not on their unaided merit
but by reason of the artificial inflation of AT&T's costs and ar-
tificial restraints on AT&T's marketing efforts.
The cost inflation was primarily attributable to the higher
rate AT&T was required to pay for access to the local ex-
changes. The discount enjoyed by AT&T's rivals was rational-
ized as reflecting only the superior access arrangements
enjoyed by AT&T. More pragmatically, the higher access
charge to AT&T reflected political opposition to any sudden
deprivation of the long lines subsidy to local telephone service.
In any event, the crucial cost advantage of AT&T's rivals is
about to disappear for two reasons: (1) the disparity of access
service has been virtually eliminated by vast re-engineering re-
quired by the MFJ's equal access provisions; and (2) the access
cost itself is being shifted from the long distance suppliers to
telephone subscribers, on the controversial theory that the long
distance connection is a facility purchased by the subscriber
rather than an input cost of providing long distance service.
The artificial restraint on AT&T's marketing of long distance
service consists of resistance by the government against preda-
tory low rates offered to big customers. The alleged predation
lies in the asserted failure of these rates to cover total costs or
even marginal costs. Such a price war can be waged more
readily by a financial giant than by smaller rivals even if, by
some measure, the rivals are more efficient. Economic justifi-
cation for rates that radically discriminate in favor of big cus-
tomers is found in the fact that these customers can resort to
alternative non-regulated communications systems, and so may
bypass the regulated system. It is arguably desirable to keep
such customers on the regulated system at rates that exceed
incremental costs however slightly, since that will make some
1986]
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contribution to fixed and overhead costs to the benefit of
smaller users. Otherwise, fixed costs-a high proportion of to-
tal costs in telecommunications-would have to be borne en-
tirely by the small customers remaining in the system. The
whole question of cost of serving various groups of customers
and the ultimate impact of price discrimination and bypass is so
fraught with accounting and policy perplexities that no attempt
is made here to do more than alert the reader to this stumbling
block in the way of establishing fair and free competition in
telecommunications.
The theory of the MFJ - safeguarding competition by segre-
gating lawfully monopolized local telephone service from un-
regulated business - has been compromised in a number of
significant respects. In the first place, the decree permitted a
great deal of integration of local telephone service with other
putatively competitive businesses. The RBOCs were, for exam-
ple, awarded the immensely profitable Yellow Page directory
business, although publishing advertising directories is a com-
petitive, unregulated field.12 Notably the RBOCs maintained
an immense share of the long distance business under the MFJ
by the device of defining "local" areas so generously as to em-
brace hundreds of miles of toll service. Moreover, non-Bell sys-
tems remained free to conglomerate their operations since they
were not defendants in the Bell antitrust case and since the
FCC's deregulation program substantially liberated "non-domi-
nant" firms from federal regulation.
However, the most striking of the seemingly "anticompeti-
tive" aspects of the MFJ have been the overt restrictions on the
kinds of non- telephone businesses in which the RBOCs might
engage. They were forbidden to provide data processing or
other information services over their own communications net-
work, i.e., prevented from competing with some of their own
customers, including the press. The RBOCs were restrained
from competing in the long distance market (other than the
portion thereof allotted to them by definition as "local"). Even
more unwelcome to the RBOCs was the restraint against diver-
sifying into non-telephone business. Such ventures require spe-
cific permission or "waiver" by the antitrust court. Waiver has
been granted freely where the court has perceived no substan-
tial likelihood that competition would be impaired by using the
12. AT&T, 552 F. Supp. at 152.
[Vol. 9:1
INTRODUCTION
telephone monopoly to favor the affiliated enterprises.1 3 How-
ever, irksome constraints against conglomeration continue and
are the principal target of proposed legislation.
Readers of this symposium may find useful background not
only in the foregoing historical sketch, but also in some indica-
tion of the main criticisms that have been leveled at the MFJ
generally. These may be listed as follows:
1) The MFJ "broke up" the Bell System in the wrong way by
attempting to segregate 16cal and long distance service. Cus-
tomers are most inconveniently served by fragmentation of
billing and repair responsibilities. It would have'been better to
place the entire responsibility for an integrated service on the
locally regulated phone companies. That would have left them
free to procure the long distance component of their service
from competing suppliers. Moreover, the MFJ was deficient in
failing to divest Western Electric from the overwhelmingly
dominant long distance company.
2) The antidiversification policy must be strengthened. It is
not enough to veto a particular venture on the basis of anti-
competitive potential for diversion of telephone revenues in
favor of affiliated enterprises. Such a policy favors conglomera-
tion into the most remote and exotic ventures - for example,
overseas ventures or ventures in risky new technologies with
which telephone managements have little familiarity. The
dominant concern in regulatory conglomeration of telephone
companies is not an antitrust but a regulatory concern: keeping
the management's attention squarely on its core task of provid-
ing an essential public service. It should be recognized as par-
ticularly baneful to allow a conglomerate holding company's
management to intervene between the regulated enterprise
and the regulating agency. Such a management will have fre-
quent occasions to intervene, on account of its own diverse fi-
nancial concerns, against proposals that a free telephone
management might make - for example, to expand or replace
a plant, to change dividend policy, or to lower or raise rates.
3) The MFJ unjustifiably restrains competition when it bars
telephone companies from investing in other fields. This objec-
tion is mentioned here mainly to refute it. Not every constraint
on entry is necessarily against public policy. Any such proposi-
13. See Schwartz, Diversification and Regulated Industries-What's Next for the
Telephone Company? 7 CoMM/ENT L.J. 195 (1985).
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tion runs counter to numerous restraints imposed on utilities,
banks, and broadcasters, for example, with regard to diversifi-
cation and affiliation. Restraints on imports to protect infant
industries are another example. More to the point are the anti-
trust precedents imposing restraints against entry by a domi-
nant firm into competition with a newly-divested subsidiary. 4
The propriety of a particular restraint on entry is therefore
open to examination. However, as I stated earlier, an impor-
tant general consideration, in the case of public utilities, is the
desirability of focusing the management's attention on the core
responsibility of providing vital public services for which there
are no substitutes or alternative sources.
4) The MFJ imposes too much regulatory responsibility on
the Department of Justice and on the district court. Partial
and intermittent intervention by these agencies cannot be an
effective permanent substitute for unified supervision and co-
herent policy of one administrative agency. That must be said
even though one recognizes the complementary nature of anti-
trust and regulation and the utmost importance of recurrent
antitrust intervention when regulation proves ineffectual or
the agency gives inadequate recognition to competitive con-
cerns. Vindicating justice is a different and perhaps higher
function than managing vast enterprises. Boredom and mortal-
ity set a temporal limit on a single judge's administrative policy;
that of his successor will be almost accidentally determined by
political influences on appointment and assignment.
The crucial issue, therefore, is not whether regulatory re-
sponsibilities should be revested in the FCC, but what the
terms of that transfer will be, including the conditions to assure
that the proper substantive goals will be pursued. Ultimately, a
change of forum should not be a cover for subversion of sub-
stantive goals.
14. Ford Motor Co. v. United States, 405 U.S. 562 (1972).
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